I propose a new estimation method for …nite sequential games that is e¢ cient, computationally attractive, and applicable to a fairly general class of …nite sequential games that is beyond the scope of existing studies. The major challenge is computation of high-dimensional truncated integration whose domain is complicated by strategic interaction. This complication resolves when unobserved o¤-the-equilibrium-path strategies are controlled for. Separately evaluating the likelihood contribution of each subgame perfect equilibrium that generates the observed outcome allows the use of the GHK simulator, a widely used importance-sampling probit simulator. Monte Carlo experiments demonstrate the performance and robustness of the proposed method.
INTRODUCTION
In this paper, I study the structural estimation of …nite sequential games and propose a new estimation method that is e¢ cient, computationally attractive, and applicable to a fairly general class of …nite sequential games that is beyond the scope of existing studies. Existing empirical studies that consider sequential games (at least as an addition to simultaneous games) range over the entry of …rms (Bresnahan and Reiss, 1991; Berry, 1992; Mazzeo, 2002; Maruyama, 2011) , technology adoption (Schmidt-Dengler, 2006), the labor participation of couples (Kooreman, 1994; Hiedeman, 1998) , the retirement behavior of elderly couples (Jia, 2005) , the location choice of siblings (Konrad et (Redoano, 2007) , and the validity of subgame perfection in experimental economics (Andreoni and Blanchard, 2006) . All of the existing literature on sequential games has so far focused on simple cases where: the number of players is very small (two in most cases); the game structure is very simple (e.g. a binary choice symmetric game); or emphasis is not on the structural estimation of strategic e¤ect. 1 The class of games I study in this paper is …nite sequential games, i.e., …nite-horizon pure-strategy discrete-choice sequential games with perfect information, in which each player makes a decision in publicly known exogenous decision order. The econometrician knows the decision order and uses data on players and their decisions to estimate a parametric model of payo¤s and random components. The random components serve as structural errors that are observed by players, but not by the econometrician. Conceptually, solving such sequential games is straightforward by backward induction. When the random errors follow continuous distribution, such as multivariate normal distribution, the game becomes even simpler to solve, because ties occur with probability measure zero and there always exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. Once the relationship from realized values of the random errors to a unique equilibrium outcome is established, the remaining task is simply to seek parameter values that minimize a certain distance between the predicted and observed game outcomes. Computationally, however, except for extremely simple games, estimating sequential games is challenging. Even for a fairly simple game in which four players sequentially make binary decisions, the standard maximum likelihood method is not feasible because the likelihood function does not have an analytical solution due to high-dimensional integration. Maximum likelihood based on simulation techniques is an alternative, but its computation is a daunting task; the game needs to be solved for each observation of game plays for each simulation draw for each set of candidate parameter values.
The proposed method in this paper relies on two ideas. First, I propose the use of the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) simulator, the most popular solution for approximating high-dimensional truncated integrals in standard probit models. This importance-sampling simulator recursively truncates the multivariate normal probability density function, by decomposing the multivariate normal distribution into a set of univariate normal distribution using Cholesky triangularization. 2 Sequential strategic interaction, however, complicates high-dimensional truncated integration in the probit framework, causing interdependence of truncation thresholds, which undermines the ground of the GHK's recursive conditioning approach. As the second building block of the proposed method, I propose the use of the GHK simulator not for the observed equilibrium outcome per se, but separately for each of all the subgame perfect strategy pro…les that rationalize the observed equilibrium outcome. In the sequential game framework, the observed equilibrium outcome arises according to the underlying subgame perfect equilibrium, but the econometrician does not observe the underlying equilibrium, because an equilibrium strategy consists of a complete contingent plan, which includes o¤-the-equilibrium-path strategies as unobserved counterfactuals. Even if a unique subgame perfect equilibrium is guaranteed, from the econometrician's viewpoint, there may exist different realizations of unobservables that lead to di¤erent subgame perfect equilibria that generate an observationally equivalent game outcome.
The use of subgame perfection allows us to uniquely determine the corresponding subgame perfect equilibrium for each realization of random components. I show that the separate evaluation of likelihood contribution for each subgame perfect strategy pro…le allows us to 2 Although the use of the GHK requires the assumption of normal distribution for the random components, its ‡exibility in the covariance structure allows us to deal with a fairly broad class of sequential games.
control for the unobserved o¤-the-equilibrium-path strategies so that the recursive conditioning of the GHK works by making the domain of Monte Carlo integration (hyper-)rectangular.
The econometrician then obtains the probability of the observed outcome by summing the probabilities of each subgame perfect equilibrium that rationalizes the observed outcome, and the use of maximum likelihood follows. Section 2 positions the proposed method in the empirical game literature and discusses the potential usefulness of the method. After formally presenting the setup in Section 3, I explain in Section 4 how the GHK simulator can aid high-dimensional integration under subgame perfection. In Section 5, to demonstrate the performance and robustness of the proposed estimation method, I conduct Monte Carlo experiments. Section 6 discusses potential extension and computation issues.
RELATION TO THE LITERATURE AND APPLICA-BILITY
This paper builds on a line of research on the estimation of non-cooperative discrete games, initiated by Bjorn and Vuong (1984) and Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) . Recent development in this literature has mostly centered around two issues: the identi…cation problem due to multiple equilibria 3 and the computation problem. This paper contributes to the latter by providing a direction di¤erent from recent developments. There is a very active literature (2007) is based on a computationally convenient two-step approach, developed by Hotz and Miller (1993) , which exploits the mapping in discrete choice problems between conditional choice probabilities and "choice-speci…c" value functions. The computational advantage of this type of method comes from the fact that it only uses necessary conditions of equilibrium and does not explicitly compute equilibrium. Two general drawbacks to these estimators are the information loss that may lead to substantial …nite sample bias and the di¢ culty of conducting counterfactual simulations. The approach proposed in this paper does not have these drawbacks as it is based on the explicit calculation of equilibrium.
The recent work by Jia (2008) on the location choice of discount chains has some similarities to this paper in that she studies a discrete simultaneous complete-information game with a large choice set. Her innovative approach to the dimensionality problem relies on the lattice theory. For her approach to work, however, the model has to satisfy several strong restrictions. 4 Similarly, the literature on incomplete information static games computes equilibrium by using …xed point theorem (e.g. Seim, 2007) . The …xed point algorithm works well as long as the underlying assumptions are satis…ed. My approach, on the other hand, relies on the backward induction algorithm to …nd equilibrium, a conceptually much simpler approach, which works in a fairly general class of …nite sequential games.
Whether sequentiality is a reasonable assumption to make depends on each application.
In entry games, for example, there may not be an explicit sequence in the …rst place. It may be natural that the recent empirical game literature has centered around the identi…cation issue under the possibility of multiple equilibria. The sequential game assumption allows this paper to circumvent the issue of multiple equilibria but the validity of the assumption needs to be warranted in each application.
More important, the sequential game framework is not merely a technical assumption to avoid multiple equilibria but a tool to investigate sequential strategic interaction, such as the …rst-mover (dis-)advantage and preemptive behavior to deter a rival's action. Sequential interaction is observed in a wide range of real world phenomena: heavily regulated industries, organizational decision making, labor disputes, judicial cases, decisions among siblings, drafts in sports leagues, parlor and TV show games, and so on. Innumerable theoretical studies on sequential games exist, but there has been little empirical work devoted to quantifying the relevance and implications of sequential interaction.
It is worthwhile to point out that the proposed method does not fully resolve the high dimensionality problem. The GHK signi…cantly facilitates high-dimensional integration, but as the game size increases, the number of possible strategy pro…les increases exponentially.
Although there are ways to further improve computational e¢ ciency, as discussed in the last section, computational practicality remains a challenge when a game is very large.
5
The bene…t of the proposed method will be fully exploited when an application focuses on sequential interaction in a middle-sized game, which is not overly large but if larger than 5 The maximum size of the game a researcher can practically estimate depends on various factors, such as imposed game structures, the sample size, and the availability of high performance computing. the two-player binary-choice game. On one hand, the two-player Stackelberg game, which has been widely studied in the theoretical literature, has limited use in empirical research.
On the other hand, an application with a game played by a large number of players may entail less value in inference on sequential interaction; other empirical frameworks such as a simultaneous game may be more appropriate.
The paper by Johar and Maruyama (2012) o¤ers an example of the intended use of the proposed method. The paper concerns the location choice of adult siblings. In our setup, adult siblings make location decisions in their birth order-the order they …nish their schooling-while the well-being of their elderly parents is their shared concern. This setting creates a public good problem and sequential strategic interaction. The game is not large: we consider families with up to four siblings and the decision is binary-whether to live far away from the parent or not. 6 The model, instead, features very rich structures. The error term has a complex covariance structure in which correlation among siblings depends on their characteristics, such as age and gender di¤erences. We do not impose a priori assumption on strategic complementarity; instead the model allows for heterogeneous strategic e¤ect across players and families. Our full model involves 38 parameters. The data set constructed from the US Health and Retirement Study includes more than ten thousand adult children.
The proposed algorithm performs very well, leading us to …nd economically insigni…cant sequential interaction but a signi…cant public good problem. 6 We set the upper limit at four because of our empirical focus, not due to computational feasibility.
MODEL

The Sequential Game
The model is a …nite sequential game with perfect information. There are i = 1; :::; N players, each makes a decision in publicly known exogenous order. The game can be set up so that players take multiple turns alternately. Each player chooses an "action" a i from a …nite set of actions A i , e.g. ("left", "right") and ("enter", "not enter"). 7 De…ne A i A i and let a (a 1 ; :::; a N ) denote a generic element of A. Player i's payo¤, such as utility or pro…t, from action a i depends on a i , the vector of actions taken by the other players. The payo¤
where 1 is a vector of parameters and vector x contains exogenous characteristics that describe the players and the environment in which the game is played. The …rst term, i (a; x; 1 ), is an assumed parametric function of mean payo¤s. The second term, "
a random preference shock player i incurs when a i is chosen. De…ne a vector, " i f"
and " (" 1 ; :::; " N ). " follows continuous parametric density function, g ("; 2 ), where 2 is a vector of parameters. 8 , 9 Both x and " are common knowledge to the players, but the 7 Allowing the choice set to vary across decision nodes is possible by de…ning A i as a union of available alternatives at each decision node. 8 g ("; 2 ) may depend on x; for example, the error terms of players with similar characteristics may be positively correlated. 9 I assume the additive separability of the random shock term following much of the existing literature, such as Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) . In the following discussion, this assumption is not essential as long as econometrician observes only x.
All the game theoretical concepts used in this paper are textbook standard, except for "action pro…le", a, de…ned above, which records decisions made on the equilibrium path and corresponds to what the econometrician observes as a game outcome in data, whether the game is sequential or simultaneous. An extensive form game is a perfect information game if every information set is a singleton decision node. With perfect information, every decision made earlier is observable for the following players. Player i's (pure) strategy, s i 2 S i , speci…es her decision at each decision node. 10 De…ne S i S i and let s (s 1 ; :::; s N ) 2 S denote a strategy pro…le. Since s uniquely determines a game outcome, de…ne a (s) : S ! A and a i (s) : S ! A i . In the example of a two player sequential entry game, if s leader = ("In") and s follower = ("In" if leader stays out; "Out" if leader enters), then a (s) = (In; Out).
Given the primitives de…ned above, each player chooses the option that maximizes the payo¤ taking rivals' behavior as given. The solution concept of the game in this paper is subgame perfection, which is a re…nement of Nash equilibrium to exclude certain strategies such as noncredible threat. A subgame of an extensive form game with perfect information is a subset of the game that begins with a single decision node, contains all the decision nodes that are successors of this node, and contains only these nodes. A subgame perfect equilibrium, s e , is a strategy pro…le in which each player's strategy is the best response to the strategies of the other players in every subgame. It is a well-known fact that every the identi…cation of parameter estimates is established. 10 Incorporating mixed strategies in the present framework is computationally impractical and beyond the scope of this paper.
…nite game with perfect information has a pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium (Zermelo's theorem). Furthermore, in the current setup, the game almost surely has a unique equilibrium, because ties occur with probability measure zero. Denote this subgame perfect equilibrium, s e (x; "; 1 ), and its i'th component, s e i (x; "; 1 ). An equilibrium outcome function is also de…ned as a e (x; "; 1 ) a (s e (x; "; 1 )), with its i'th component, a e i (x; "; 1 ).
Given (x; "; 1 ), the game can be solved to obtain s e by backward induction. In other words,
given (x; 1 ), each realization of " results in a unique subgame perfect equilibrium.
Data
The econometrician observes T independent realizations of the game, ( 1 ; :::; T ), e.g., T di¤erent markets, T di¤erent families, and T periods of time. Each realization of the game is indexed by t = 1; :::; T . The structure and environment of the game may vary across t in terms of the number and identity of players, the choice set of each player, the decision order, and covariates x. The parametric forms of i (a t ; x t ; " it ; 1 ) and g i ("
; 2 ) and parameters,
, are assumed to be invariant across t to draw statistical inferences. In each t, the econometrician observes equilibrium outcome a o t and covariate vector x t . Equilibrium strategy s e it is not observed as it contains counterfactuals. The econometrician knows the structure of game t , such as the number of players and the decision order either from institutional knowledge, by assumption, or from observation of data. In the following, I drop the subscript for each game, t, when no ambiguity arises.
To utilize a probit simulator below, I assume a normal distribution for " t as
Covariance matrix has a dimension of
[the number of action alternatives for i] and is parameterized by 2 . For the parameterization of , the usual identi…cation conditions of probit models apply. In particular, the fact that payo¤ it is an unobserved latent construct means that what the econometrician can infer from observed decisions concerns only the relative comparison of payo¤s among alternatives and, consequently, two types of normalization for " are required. First, the random shock of an alternative is normalized to zero so that the interpretation of " t is the relative di¤erence in random shocks between the normalized alternative and the other alternatives. Second, the variance of " is also not identi…ed.
Following the convention, it is normalized to one. 11 Below, I abuse notation and use " and to denote the error structure after normalization.
Estimation and the High-Dimensional Integration
The task of the econometrician is to make statistical inferences on based on the structure of game t and the assumed parametric forms of i (a; x; " i ; 1 ) and g i ("
. Since the distribution of " is speci…ed fully parametrically, the estimation procedure relies on maximum 11 In applications with more model structures, information on the level of payo¤s may be available and aid identi…cation, making the normalization of the variance of error terms unnecessary. For example, in the analysis of entry decisions of health insurance plans, Maruyama (2011) uses equilibrium variable pro…ts that are recovered from the demand estimation and the level of …xed costs is identi…ed.
likelihood. Game t is the unit for which individual likelihood is de…ned. The individual likelihood is de…ned as
This leads to the following maximum likelihood problem:
The challenge in this maximum likelihood framework is that the probability term in (3) involves high-dimensional integrals and generally does not have an analytical solution. The dimension depends on the number of players and the number of alternatives each player has. 12 There are several cases where this likelihood function is easily computed. First is the two dimensional case (Stackelberg games), which arises, for example, if the number of players is two and the decision to be made is binary. The econometrician can then solve the two threshold values for (" 1t ; " 2t ) in accordance with the observed equilibrium outcome, a o t . The bivariate normal distribution function then produces an analytical solution for the probability term. If the dimension of integration increases to three, an analytical solution is generally not available, but the quadrature method enables numerical approximation. Another special case is when each stochastic component in " t follows an independent univariate normal distribution. In this case, though the game still needs to be solved for an equilibrium, once 12 The dimension also depends on the number of turns each player has, if multiple decisions are assumed.
it is solved, obtaining an analytical solution is trivial. In most applications, however, the independent normal assumption is fairly restrictive. It implies no game speci…c error (e.g. market speci…c random component). When the choice set is larger than the binary case, it also implies a quite restrictive substitution pattern among alternatives.
For high-dimensional integration, the literature has developed the maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) method, which utilizes Monte Carlo integration. 13 The most straightforward simulator for MSL is the crude frequency simulator, …rst proposed by Lerman and Manski (1981) . The simulator for the current setup is given by
where I [ ] denotes an indicator function. The simulation procedure takes R sets of random draws from the assumed distribution. For each random draw e " r t , an equilibrium outcome a e t is solved by backward induction. The probability simulator is based on how many times the predicted equilibrium outcome coincides with the observed equilibrium outcome out of R times repetition of simulation draws. Although this simulator provides estimates that are consistent with R and T , it has two major limitations. First, the simulated probability is a discontinuous function of the parameters and is not bounded away from 0 and 1. 13 The method of simulated moments (MSM) and the method of simulated scores (MSS) are alternative options. These may improve the …nite sample property of estimators by removing the simulation bias that results from the logarithm in the log likelihood function (Hajivassiliou and McFadden, 1998 
The GHK Simulator
For high-dimensional integration over a region of the multivariate normal, the most popular simulator is the GHK simulator (Geweke, 1992; Hajivassiliou and McFadden, 1994;  and Keane, 1994) . The GHK simulator recursively truncates the multivariate normal probability density function. Its algorithm draws recursively from truncated univariate normal distributions, and relies on Cholesky triangularization to decompose the multivariate normal distribution into a set of univariate normal distributions. The combination of the recursive conditioning approach and the algorithm to generate a smooth univariate truncated variate produces an unbiased and smooth importance-sampling simulator. Importance sampling aims to achieve higher e¢ ciency by adjusting the weight or "importance" of di¤erent points The complication in using the GHK simulator for empirical games arises from the recursive conditioning approach. The GHK algorithm repeats recursive simulation draws from truncated univariate normal distributions so that the resulting random shocks, e " r , generate the observed equilibrium outcome, a o . The requirement for this recursive conditioning is that, in the " space, the truncation threshold for each simulation draw is independent of other simulation draws and hence, the truncation thresholds are orthogonal to each other.
However, because of sequential strategic interaction, the truncation threshold for a draw may depend on other simulation draws, and recursive conditioning simulation breaks down.
USING THE GHK SIMULATOR
The problem of interdependent truncation thresholds arises as a result of changes in unobserved o¤-the-equilibrium-path strategies. This point is best illustrated by an example entry game that is played by two players, …rm 1 and …rm 2. 14 Firm 1 is the Stackelberg leader. Having observed …rm 1's entry decision, …rm 2 makes its entry decision. Firms 1 Figure 1 : TWO PLAYER STACKELBERG ENTRY GAME and 2 incur random shocks " 1 and " 2 respectively in their pro…t functions. For illustration purposes, assume that the rival's entry reduces payo¤ (this is not essential for the framework proposed in this paper). Each …rm enters the market when it expects nonnegative pro…ts from entry. If it does not enter, a …rm earns zero pro…t. Given the assumed payo¤ functions, the realized values of " 1 and " 2 determine which market outcome occurs ( Figure 1 ). A …rm with a larger random shock is more likely to enter the market. However, the e¤ects of " 1 and " 2 are not symmetric and the decisions of the two …rms are not independent of each other, due to the sequential nature of the game. The center part of Figure 1 shows the asymmetry;
when neither " 1 nor " 2 has dominant in ‡uence, only …rm 1, the leader with the …rst mover advantage, enters. The goal here is to establish a computationally practical Monte Carlo integration method to evaluate the probability for each market outcome in the likelihood function. Figure 2 illustrates this task by superimposing the probability density function of " 1 and " 2 . In this example, market con…guration (Out,In) does not allow the use of the standard GHK simulator, because the domain of integration is not a rectangle, and thus drawing " 1 cannot be conditional on " 2 and vice-versa.
The notion of subgame perfection solves this dependency. Indeed, this non-rectangular shaped domain of integration stems from a behavioral change in an o¤-the-equilibrium path.
The strategic interaction in this sequential game is illustrated by its extensive form ( Figure   3 ). With perfect information, …rm 2 has two singleton decision nodes, and the choice set of …rm 2 consists of four strategies: "never enter", "imitate", "preempted", and "always enter". Assuming "Out" for …rm 1, Figure 3 shows four possible equilibrium pro…les. The extensive form highlights several important facts. First, subgame perfection implies that …rm 2 chooses the best option based on its random shock, " 2 , irrespective of " 1 . Facing a large negative shock, …rm 2 chooses "never enter". For a large positive shock, …rm 2 chooses "always enter". For a medium value of " 2 , …rm 2 chooses "preempted", i.e. it enters the market only if …rm 1 does not. 15 Thus, " 1 does not a¤ect the thresholds of " 2 that determine the choice of …rm 2. Second, di¤erent strategy pro…les may generate game outcomes that are observationally equivalent to the econometrician. In Figure 3 , strategy pro…les (3) and (4) both result in (Out,In). However, the two strategies of …rm 2 under (3) and (4) have di¤erent implications for …rm 1's decision. When preemption is possible, the entry threshold for …rm 1 is lower and the integration domain of " 1 is larger. Figure 4 incorporates these considerations into the (" 1 ; " 2 ) space. Now the (Out,In) area is divided into two rectangles, each representing di¤erent strategy pro…les, i.e. (3) "preempted" and (4) "always enter" as named in Figure 3 . The standard GHK procedure works as long as the domain of integration is rectangular, or hyperrectangular in a general n-dimensional space, and therefore, we can simulate the likelihood function by evaluating each subgame perfect equilibrium separately.
To formalize the discussion so far in the general n-dimensional case, let s i denote the subvector of strategy pro…le s that excludes component i, and let s Figure 4 : DIVIDING AN OBSERVED MARKET OUTCOME INTO STRATEGY PRO-FILES the function that determines the best response strategy of player i given x; " i ; and s i . Given (x; " i ; s i ), the best response strategy of player i is uniquely determined almost surely by comparing payo¤s at each decision node. Then, the following result holds.
Proposition 1 For any strategy pro…le s 2 S, if there exists a set of f"g that rationalizes s as a subgame perfect strategy pro…le given x and 1 , then f"js e (x; "; 1 ) = s g = i " i js
BR i
x; " i ; s i ; 1 = s i :
In words, the set of " under which s solves the game as a subgame perfect equilibrium can be written as a Cartesian product of each player's set of " i under which s i is the best response strategy to s i .
Proof. In a …nite sequential game with continuous random unobservables, player i's best response strategy is uniquely determined by s i ; x; and " i almost surely. Thus, given s i and x, the set of " i under which s i is the best response strategy to s i does not depend on another player's component of ". Then the proposition follows trivially.
The logic underlying this proposition comes directly from the Nash equilibrium concept, not speci…cally from subgame perfection. However, for this result to hold, the best response needs to be uniquely determined. The subgame perfection (and hence the assumption of a sequential game) plays the key role in avoiding indeterminacy from the " space to each player's best response. 16 The main virtue of the proposition is that for any observed market outcome, a o , by dividing the integration problem into the subgame perfect equilibria that rationalize a o , the interdependency of integral intervals across players resolves and the standard GHK procedure can be used. When the econometrician ignores subgame perfection and only considers observed actions, a o , the realized value of " j may change player j's o¤-the-equilibrium-path decisions, which in turn a¤ects the set of " i under which player i chooses a 
The second equality holds owing to the fact that any " leads to a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. Given the discussion so far, using the GHK simulator for each subgame perfect equilibrium is trivial. The rest of this section sets out this standard procedure to evalu- The probability that the event, s = s e (x; "; 1 ), occurs can be rewritten using an integral.
Let n ("; ) denote the probability density function of the multivariate normal variates, ";
with zero mean and covariance matrix . Then
The last equality holds from the proposition. Covariance matrix ( 2 ) takes a parametric form of 2 that allows identi…cation. De…ning a set i (x; s; 1 )
The set i (x; s; 1 ) represents the conditions that random shocks " i needs to satisfy for s i to be player i's best response given s 1 . Before applying the GHK simulator, I introduce Cholesky decomposition. For the simplicity of exposition, assume the choice set of player i = 1; :::; N is binary. Then, after normalization, " 2 R N and ( 2 ) is a N N matrix. Allowing more than two alternatives is straightforward under the GHK procedure. Denote the lower-triangular Cholesky factor of ( 2 ) as L so that LL 0 = ( 2 ). Denote = ( 1 ; :::; N ) an N -dimensional multivariate standard normal vector; N (0; I N ). Hence we can write " = L N (0; ( 2 )). I introduce notation to simplify the following presentation. For a vector of indexes (1; :::; N ), the notation "< i" denotes the subvector (1; :::; i 1) and " i" denotes the subvector (1; :::; i).
Thus, for a vector ", " <i is the subvector of the …rst i 1 components, and " i is the subvector excluding component i. For a matrix L; L ii is the i-th diagonal elements of L, and L i;<i and L i; i denote vectors containing the …rst i 1 and i elements of row i, respectively. Using
Then the probability expression becomes
where () is the probability density function of the univariate standard normal distribution.
The simulated likelihood with the GHK simulator is constructed as follows. After obtaining simulated e r , the probability for " i to satisfy s i = s 
Using this simulator, the estimation procedure solves the following maximum simulated likelihood problem,
This maximum likelihood problem is solved using numerical derivatives. In searching b , each iteration should use the same simulation draws e u 1 ; :::; e u R to minimize standard errors.
MONTE CARLO EXPERIMENTS
Experimental Design
In Ten arti…cial data sets are generated using pseudo-random numbers. Each data set consists of 3,000 market observations and around 8,300 market-…rm observations and contains information on the list of potential entrants, covariates, and generated random shocks in each market. Throughout all the experiments conducted below, I use the same ten data sets for better compatibility of the simulation results. The experiments I conduct vary in three aspects. First, I investigate the e¤ects of changes in strategic e¤ect and decision order.
These changes in the data generating process alter market outcomes in the data, i.e. the entry decision of each …rm in each market, which is generated by solving the game. Second, to check the computational performance, I examine the e¤ects of changing the simulation framework, such as the number of simulation draws. Third, to study the e¤ect of misspeci…cation, I
impose restrictions on estimated models.
Model and Data Generating Process
In market t, N t …rms play the entry game, where N t 2 f1; : : : ; 6g. Firm i in market t chooses to enter if it expects a non-negative pro…t. The expected pro…t from entry, it , is
where x it is a vector of covariates that are speci…c to either market t, …rm i, or …rm-market pair (i; t), " it is the …rm-market speci…c random component, and n is the number of …rms that choose to enter market t. The key parameter, , captures the strategic e¤ect. For simplicity, the strategic e¤ect is assumed to depend only on the number of competitors, not their identity. The random term " it is not observed by the econometrician but is known to every …rm, and follows a multivariate normal distribution: " t = (" 1t ; :::; " Nt;t ) 0 N (0; t ).
The payo¤ when a …rm does not enter is normalized to 0. The econometrician desires to learn about ; ; and based on observed entry decisions and x it .
The covariate vector contains the following variables: two market-speci…c continuous variables, population (pop) and distance (dist); a …rm-market speci…c continuous variable, past pro…tability in neighboring markets (pastp); a …rm-market level dummy variable that indicates the …rm's presence at both airports of the route in the previous period, city2; and nroute, a …rm-speci…c variable for the number of existing routes in the country (in 100's)
that indicates the size of each …rm and determines the decision order.
Data on the pool of entrants and covariates are generated using pseudo-random numbers. For each of 3,000 markets, I …rst generate market population, pop, the number of potential entrants, N City1, and the number of potential entrants with a presence at two airports, N City2 based on trivariate normal distribution. These three variables are assumed to be positively correlated with covariance matrix with a presence at both airports of the market are also randomly chosen up to the number of N City2 (each …rm with same probability). This generates the dummy variable, city2.
The two remaining variables, dist and pastp are independently generated from the standard normal distribution.
The error component " it is generated for the ten data sets and is kept …xed throughout all experiments. The covariance matrix of the error component, t , is assumed to be a N t N t matrix with diagonal elements, 1.0, and o¤-diagonal elements, 2 . In other words, " it consists of two independent standard normal errors, ( it ; t ), as
where is a correlation among the error terms within a market and t measures a marketspeci…c factor that makes entry more attractive for all …rms in the market. The correlation,
, is set to be 0.7, which implies it and t have about the same weights in the error term.
The coe¢ cients on (constant, pop; dist; pastp; city2; nroute) are set to be ( 5:0, 1:2, 0:0, 0:4, 1:5, 0:0). To highlight the misspeci…cation bias, the coe¢ cient on …rm size, nroute, is set to zero so that the …rm size a¤ects pro…ts not directly, only via the decision order. Once I specify these parameter values, the value of strategic e¤ect parameter, , and the decision order, I can solve the game by backward induction and obtain data on market outcome. The default speci…cation is = 2:0 and assumes that …rms make decisions in order of nroute. I also conduct experiments with = 1:0 to study the e¤ect of the degree of strategic e¤ect and experiments with randomized decision order to study the robustness of the proposed method with respect to decision order. Tables 1 and 2 Since the pool of potential entrants is constructed randomly but with probability proportional to …rm size, …rm 1 appears in the data set most frequently and …rm 6 least frequently. When = 1:0, the early-mover advantages are smaller, so the entry propensity does not vary much across …rms, whereas when = 2:0, the larger early-mover advantages reduce the entry propensity of followers. 
Results of the Experiments
The …rst set of Monte Carlo experiments is based on the correct model speci…cation and concerns about the size of potential simulation bias inherent in the method of simulated likelihood for a small number of simulation draws. A debate exists in the literature on the choice between the method of simulated likelihood and the method of simulated mo- Ruud (1994) provide evidence of the instability of the method of simulated moment estimator. Nevertheless, the number of simulation draws that will lead to a su¢ ciently small bias is an empirical question speci…c to each application, and in particular depends on the complexity of the covariance structure of error terms. Table 3 Note: parameter, DGP data generating value, b average parameter estimate, ASE average asymptotic standard error, MSE root mean square error, LogL average log likelihood value.
The next series of experiments examines the e¤ect of misspeci…cation by imposing restrictions on the correctly speci…ed model ( Table 4 ). The data generating process assumes Note: parameter, DGP data generating value, b avg parameter estimate, ASE avg asymptotic standard error, MSE root mean square error, LogL avg log likelihood value, BIC avg Bayesian information criterion. Table 5 reports the results of the same comparison for = 1:0, which re ‡ects a weaker strategic e¤ect. Overall the results are consistent with the previous table. One notable di¤erence is that misspecifying and ignoring the sequential interaction leads to much less reduction in the model …t. The last set of experiments introduces various degrees of randomness in the decision order. In many potential applications, the econometrician may have a priori information that re ‡ects the true decision order only approximately. This limited knowledge about the true decision order motivates this experiment. Speci…cally, while the estimated models still assume that …rms make decisions in order of nroute, I modify the data generating process in such a way that the true decision order is determined by a weighted sum of nroute and a random variable that follows a uniform distribution with the same mean and variance as nroute. Thus, the weight of this uniform random variable captures the level of imprecision of the decision order information used in the estimation. Table 6 reports the results for di¤erent degrees of randomness. The results show that when the econometrician correctly speci…es more than 90 percent of the decision order, the di¤erences between the estimated coe¢ cients and their population values tend to be smaller than the estimated standard error. 
DISCUSSION AND EXTENSIONS
The Perfect Information Assumption
The perfect information assumption plays a key role in guaranteeing a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. The uniqueness is necessary to specify the domain of integration in the " space for each strategy pro…le that rationalizes the observed game outcome, without making a strong (often ad hoc) assumption on the equilibrium selection mechanism. The perfect information assumption, however, may be too strong in many applications. The assumption does not hold when some players have private information, when players move simultaneously, and when "nature" may bring in uncertainty. Relaxing the perfect informa-tion assumption is possible as long as the uniqueness of an equilibrium is guaranteed for any possible values of random shocks, ". In general the following approaches potentially help to relax the perfect information assumption. First, we can specify the game and payo¤ function in such a way that a unique subgame perfect equilibrium is guaranteed. Second, focusing on a set of equilibria might provide uniqueness. An example is an entry game in which the identity of entering …rms is not uniquely determined but the number of entrants is uniquely determined (Berry, 1992) . Third, an equilibrium concept that is stronger than subgame perfection may help to avoid the multiplicity of equilibria. For example, sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson, 1982) may reduce the set of subgame perfect equilibrium strategy pro…les when decision nodes that are never reached exist (Litan and Pimienta, 2008) . Fourth, some equilibrium selection mechanism can be assumed. The use of the notions of Pareto and risk-dominance may provide a reasonable option if it leads to a unique equilibrium.
Decision Order
The entry game example in the previous section assumes that each …rm makes a one-shot decision sequentially. In general, the proposed method allows players to take multiple turns alternately. In simulating the likelihood function, all turns of player i must be simulated at once, as the strategy of each player consists of a decision at every decision node.
A more fundamental issue on decision order is the empirical analogue of decision order.
The proposed method utilizes a publicly known exogenous decision order. In some applications, even if sequential interaction appears likely, such decision order may not be available or may be endogenously determined. The above Monte Carlo experiments illustrate that misspecifying the true decision order may lead to a signi…cantly biased estimate of strategic e¤ect. At the same time, if the game is correctly speci…ed except for decision order, we can draw an inference about not only structural parameters but also decision order. Speci…cally, the econometrician can estimate di¤erent models, each with a di¤erent imposed decision order, then conduct a model selection test for non-nested speci…cations. Advancing this idea further, estimation of the population decision order by selecting the decision order that maximizes the likelihood function may be a possibility. The statistical properties of an estimated decision order and how to deal with the discontinuity that arises from maximization over decision orders are left for future research. 17 
Computational Feasibility
For applications with relatively simple games, the computation burden of the proposed estimation procedure is fairly manageable. This is due to the high performance of the GHK simulator. For example, conducting all the Monte Carlo experiments shown in this paper requires less than a half day with a standard stand-alone desktop computer.
However, as the number of players, the number of turns, or the number of alternatives increases, the size of the game tree increases exponentially and computation quickly be-comes infeasible. Though this exponential computational burden is inherent in the nature of sequential games, the following computation techniques may signi…cantly reduce computational burden. First, structures of payo¤ function and strategic interaction implied by assumed economic theory can be utilized to skip the unnecessary part of the calculation in the backward induction algorithm. In the above entry game example, the assumed negative e¤ect of a rival's entry excludes one strategy ("imitate" in Figure 3 ) from the simulation procedure. In Maruyama (2011), I exploit the non-increasing property of the pro…t function in the number of entering rival …rms; imposing this structure dramatically reduces the computation time. As a result, in the estimation of sequential games with at most 16 heterogeneous …rms, the computational burden is not found to be a signi…cant problem.
Second, given the assumed independence across each game play, parallel computing is a promising way to reduce computational burden; the parallelization of the maximum likelihood evaluation loop is straightforward. Third, variance reduction techniques will enhance the performance of the simulator. The Monte Carlo experiments above show the gain from antithetic sampling. Instead of using pseudo-random numbers, systematic simulation draws by quasi-Monte Carlo sampling, such as Halton sequences, and sampling methods based on orthogonal arrays will produce better performance (Train, 2003; Sándor and András, 2004 ).
Lastly another potential avenue is the use of a more e¢ cient importance-sampling algorithm to enhance the GHK simulator (Liesenfeld and Richard, 2010) .
